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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 9, 1997, the City of Minneapolis demolished a ten-unit
apartment building located at 1030 Morgan Avenue North.' The notori-
ous north Minneapolis rental property had received hundreds of police
calls as the scene of drug deals, murders, shootings, prostitution and other
criminal activity. Robert Zeman, the former owner and landlord of the
rental property, lost his residential dwelling license as a result of criminal3
activity that occurred on the property. The City of Minneapolis revoked
Zeman's rental dwelling license under a city housing ordinance that re-
4
quired landlords to prevent criminal activity occurring on their premises.
The license revocation eventually forced Zeman to sell the property to the
city at a significant loss. 5 Thereafter, Zeman unsuccessfully sued the city,
claiming that his license revocation constituted an illegal taking for which
he had not been compensated. 6 Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme
Court, in Zeman v. City of Minneapolis,7 allowed Minneapolis city officials to
demolish Zeman's property without compensating Zeman for the taking
of his property.
The Takings Clause of the Minnesota Constitution intends to protect
property owners from excessive regulatory burdens imposed by the gov-8
ernment. In Zeman, the court considered whether the temporary revoca-
tion of a residential dwelling license constitutes a taking requiring just
compensation under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. 9
The court reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the ordi-
nance at issue did not constitute a taking.10
The Zeman court ruled that the City of Minneapolis may temporarily
revoke a landlord's rental license for failing to address violations of disor-
1. See Steve Brandt, Neighbors Cheer Building's Demise; After Years of Problems,
1030 Morgan is Demolished, STAR Tius. (Minneapolis), July 10, 1997, at IA
[hereinafter Neighbors Cheer Building's Demise].
2. See Steve Brandt, Landlord is Sued Under Nuisance Law: Minneapolis Building
Has Been Site of Drug Deals, Two Killings, STAR TRB. (Minneapolis), August 16,
1996, at lB [hereinafter Landlord Sued Under Nuisance Law]. See also Steve Brandt,
Three Offers Reported for Troubled Apartment Building, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oc-
tober 10, 1996, at 2B.
3. See Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Minn. 1996).
4. See id.
5. See Steve Brandt, Landlord Sells Troubled North Side Building STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), April 3, 1997, at 3B [hereinafter Landlord Sells Building].
6. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 550.
7. 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1996).
8. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 (providing that " [p]rivate property shall not
be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation there-
for, first paid or secured.").
9. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 549.
10. See id. at 555.
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derly use such as on-site drug dealing and associated violence within a de-
pressed urban neighborhood. The disorderly use ordinance at issue re-
quires landlords to respond to criminal activity on their property, particu-
larly when incidents involve police intervention. 2  As a result, urban
landlords in high crime areas must risk their own safety by responding to
drug trafficking, assaults, gambling, prostitution, weapons violations and13
other disorderly conduct occurring on the licensed property. The Zeman
court justified the housing ordinance as a cooperative harm prevention
measure that "will likely be advantageous to all."' 4 Unfortunately, Zeman
places a unique burden on landlords who must either take steps to pre-
vent criminal activity on their property or face an uncompensated tak-
ing.15
Part II of this Case Note discusses the background of regulatory tak-
ings tests commonly applied by the courts. Specifically, it reviews the his-
torical tests, modem tests, and Minnesota tests. Part III discusses the facts
of the Zeman decision and the court's analysis of the takings issue. Part IV
examines Zeman's impact on regulatory takings law and criticizes the
alarming governmental mandates imposed on rental property owners. Fi-
nally, Part V concludes that the Zeman court has forced common citizens
to bear the expanding burdens of governmental regulation by failing to
clarify regulatory takings tests.
This Case Note will demonstrate that the Zeman court based its deci-
sion on a variety of takings tests, drawing analogies from previous takings16
cases. Using this haphazard approach, the Zeman court refused to an-
nounce a useful regulatory takings test and perpetuated confusing takings
11. See id. at 554. The property at issue was located in an "area of crime, fal-
ling property values, lost investments and decay." Kevin Diaz, Landlords Tough it
Out in the War Zone'" From City Condemnation Practices to Tenants With Myriad Social
Problems, Many Landlords Who Serve the Poor Find That Simply Staying Afloat Can be an
Uphill Battle, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), August 25, 1997, at IA. A group of land-
lords refer to inner-city Minneapolis as the "war zone" due to the area crime and
decreasing property values. See id.
12. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 550.
13. See MINNEAPOLIS MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 244.2020(a) (1)-(7) (1995)
(listing examples of specific conduct landlords must address, conduct which Min-
nesota has criminalized by statute). The Zeman court deemed such landlord re-
sponsibility as "incidental to operating rental dwellings in an urban area." Zeman,
552 N.W.2d at 554.
14. Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 555.
15. Zeman sold his 10-unit apartment building to three non-profit agencies
for approximately $75,000. The agencies resold it to the city for one dollar. See
Neighbors Cheer Building's Demise, supra note 1, at IA. After twenty-one years of
ownership, Zeman netted only about one-half of his original purchase price. See
Landlord Sells Building, supra note 5, at 3B.
16. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 552. The court focused on the underlying facts,
but drew "themes" from earlier takings cases. See id.
19981
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case law. 17 Moreover, the Zeman court created a new problem by requiring
common citizens, landlords of rental properties, to act as community po-
lice officers.18
II. BACKGROUND
A. Police Power Rights and Takings Clause Limits
State governments, by virtue of their sovereignty, may exercise their
established police powers to restrict property use when gromoting public
safety, health, morality or the general public welfare. The power of
"eminent domain" allows the government to take private property for pub-20
lic use. The Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause limits states'
police power by guaranteeing that private property shall not "be taken for.. 21
public use, without just compensation.
The purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent the government
from forcing burdens on individual people, when the entire public should
share the burden. Article I, section 13 of the Minnesota Constitution
17. See id. The Zeman court acknowledged that recent case law does not clar-
ify regulatory takings law. See id. The court stated that "[unfortunately, the law
does not become clearer with later cases." Id.
18. See id. at 554. The Zeman court stated that "[t]he city's decision to engage
landlords and the police department in a cooperative effort to protect residential
neighborhoods [was] well within its publicly-bestowed power and mandate." Id.
19. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)
(upholding zoning restrictions in the interest of the public). The states' police
power is a difficult concept to define because the United States Constitution does
not expressly enumerate it. Judges and legal scholars have long debated its scope.
See Brian D. Lee, Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment-Regulatory Takings Depriving
All Economically Viable Use of a Property Owner's Land Require Just Compensation Unless
the Government Can Identify Common Law Nuisance or Property Principles Furthered by
the Regulation-Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992), 23
SETON HALL L. REv 1840, 1845 n.26 (1993) (examining the scope of the state's po-
lice power in connection with property owners' rights).
20. See BLACK'S LAw DicrIoNARY, 523 (6th ed. 1990) (defining eminent do-
main as "It]he power to take private property for public use by the state, munici-
palities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of
public character).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S.
499, 502 (1945) (stating that the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation
where private property is taken for public use).
22. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (finding a taking
where the Government required a shipbuilder to turn over uncompleted ships
after defaulting on its construction contract); see also Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie
G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the United States Claims Courts: Adjusting the Bur-
dens that in Fairness and Equity Ought to be Borne By Society as a Whole, 40 CATH. U. L.
Rxv. 549 (1991) (presenting a fairness and equity analysis about regulatory takings
cases).
[Vol. 24
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provides a similar, yet broader, Takings Clause.23 In addition, takinis pro-
visions exist "expressly or by interpretation" in all state constitutions.
23. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. The Minnesota Constitution provides that
"[p1rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for a public use
without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured." Id. The Minnesota
Constitution is broader than the federal constitution due to the added language
"destroyed or damaged" referencing the property at issue. See State v. Strom, 493
N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992) (construing MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13). The Strom
court recognized that Minnesota law clearly intends to compensate citizens for
property right losses due to state action. Strom, 493 N.W. 2d at 558. The Strom
court stressed the extent of full compensation set forth in MINN. STAT. § 160.08,
subd. 5. Section 160.08 requires compensation of landowners for "any elimina-
tion of existing access, air, view, light or other compensable property rights."
Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 558 n.2.
24. See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 23 ([P]rivate property shall not be taken for, or
applied to public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor .... );
ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 18 (Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.); ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 17 (No private
property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compen-
sation having first been made .... ); ARi. CONST. art. 2, § 22 ([Pirivate property
shall not be taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compen-
sation therefor.); CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 19 (Private property may be taken or dam-
aged for public use only when just compensation... has first been paid to... the
owner.); COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 15 (Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged, for public or private use, without just compensation.); CONN. CONST. art. 1,
§ 11 (The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation therefor.); DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ([N]or shall any man's property be
taken or applied to public use... without compensation being made.); FLA.
CONST. art. 10, § 6 (No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose
and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner .... ); GA. CONST. art. 1, §
3 ([P1rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without
just and adequate compensation being first paid.); HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 20
(Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just com-
pensation.); IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 14 (Private property may be taken for public
use, but not until ajust compensation ... shall be paid therefor.); ILL. CONST. art.
1, § 15 (Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use withoutjust
compensation .... ); IND. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (No person's property shall be taken
by law, without just compensation .... ); IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 18 (Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being made .... );
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-513 (1996) (Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation.); Ky. CONST. § 13 [N]or shall any man's
property be taken or applied to public use without ... just compensation being
previously made to him.); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (Property shall not be taken or
damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and
with just compensation paid to the owner .... ); ME. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (Private
property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation .... ); MD.
CONST. art. 3, § 40 (The General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private
property, to be taken for public use, without just compensation... being first
paid .... ); MASs. CONST. pt. 1, art. 10 ([W]henever the public exigencies require
that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall
receive a reasonable compensation therefor.); MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2 (Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation there-
1998]
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B. Landowner Remedy
The inverse condemnation proceeding provides judicial remedy to
for .... ); MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (Private property shall not be taken, destroyed
or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor .... ); MISS. CONST.
art. 3, § 17 (Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use, except
on due compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof.); Mo.
CONST. art. 1, § 26 ([P]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 29 (Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation .... ); NEB.
CONST. art. 1, § 21 (The property of no person shall be taken or damaged for pub-
lic use without just compensation therefor.); NEv. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ([N]or shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation having been
first made .... ); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12 ([N]o part of a man's property shall be
taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the
representative body of the people.); N.J. CONST. art. 1, §. 20 (Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.); N.M. CONST. art. 2,
§ 20 (Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.); N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19 (No person shall
be... deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.); N.D.
CONST. art. 1, § 16 (Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation having first been made .... ) OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 19
([W] here private property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor
shall first be made .... ); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 23 (No private property shall be
taken or damaged for private use, with or without compensation, unless by con-
sent of the owner, except.., in such manner as may be prescribed by law.); OR.
CONST. art. 1, § 18 (Private property shall not be taken for public use.., without
just compensation.); PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 10 ([N]or shall private property be taken
or applied to public use, without.. .just compensation being first made .... ); R.I.
CONST. art. 1, § 16 (Private property shall not be taken for public uses, without
just compensation.); S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 13 ([P]rivate property shall not be
taken ... for public use without just compensation being first made therefor.);
S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 13 (Private property shall not be taken for public use...
without just compensation .... ); TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (That no man's particu-
lar services shall be demanded, or property taken .... without just compensation
being made therefor.); TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (No person's property shall be
taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate com-
pensation being made .... ); UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 22 (Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.); VT. CONST. ch.
1, art. 2nd ([W]henever any person's property is taken for the use of the public,
the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money.); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11
([T] he General Assembly shall not pass any law ... whereby private property shall
be taken or damaged for public uses, without just compensation .... ); WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 16 (No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or
private use without just compensation having been first made .... ); W. VA. CONST.
art. 3, § 9 (Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use, without
just compensation .... ); WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (The property of no person shall
be taken for public use without just compensation therefor.); WYO. CONST. art. 1,
§ 33 (Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use
without just compensation.).
[Vol. 24
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• 25
landowners who.oppose governmental erosion of private property rights.
When the government does not initiate a formal eminent domain pro-
ceeding, a property owner may bring an inverse condemnation action
against the government to recover property value allegedly lost through
government actions.2 6 As such, the landowner sues the governmental en-
tity that restricted the use of the property. If the plaintiff proves a taking
27occurred, the government then pays just compensation.
C. Development of the Regulatory Takings Concept
The concept of regulatory takings developed in the late 1800s. 
2
25. See Alevizos v. Metro. Airport Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 477, 216 N.W.2d
651, 657 (1974). The Alevizos court described an inverse condemnation proceed-
ing as "a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of
property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted
by the taking agency." Id. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981). The pertinent language informs:
The phrase "inverse condemnation" generally describes a cause of action
against a government defendant in which a landowner may recover just
compensation for a "taking" of his property under the Fifth Amendment,
even though formal condemnation proceedings in exercise of the sover-
eign's power of eminent domain have not been instituted by the gov-
ernment entity. In the typical condemnation proceeding, the govern-
ment brings a judicial or administrative action against the property
owner to "take" the fee simple or an interest in his property; the judicial
or administrative body enters a decree of condemnation and just com-
pensation is awarded. In an "inverse condemnation" action, the con-
demnation is "inverse" because it is the landowner, not the government
entity who institutes the proceeding (citations omitted).
Id.
26. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1987).
27. See Rockier v. Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency, 866 F. Supp. 415,
417 (D. Minn. 1994). In Minnesota, a plaintiff must bring a petition for writ of
mandamus to assert an inverse condemnation action. See id.
28. See generally, Thomas A. Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years of Su-
preme Court Regulatory Taking Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use," "Average Reci-
procity of Advantage, " and "Bundle of Rights" From Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal
14 B. C. ENVTL. Arr. L. REv. 653, 660 (1987) (discussing the history of the Takings
Clause and leading regulatory takings cases from 1879 to 1987). Hippler cites
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) as the "first comprehensive analysis"
in this area. Id. In 1887, Mugler held that regulations designed to protect the
public from harm do not constitute a taking of property under the state's power
of eminent domain. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69. One author suggests that
Mugler recognized a new property use interest completely separate from the spe-
cific physical land parcel. See Maureen Straub Kordesh, "I Will Build My House with
Sticks": The Splintering of Property Interests under the Fifth Amendment May Be Hazard-
ous to Private Property, 20 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 397, 413-14 (1996) (proposing a
proper framework to resolve the tension between police power and the Takings
1998]
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Nineteenth century courts recognized that the government could regulate
the use of private property to protect the public's morals, health, and
safety.2 This early interpretation demanded a direct physical invasion of
the plaintiffs property to constitute a taking that required just compensa-
tion. so Later interpretations of the Takings Clause expanded takings to
include nonphysical regulatory burdens.
3 '
Cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause have gener-
ally distinguished between physical occupations authorized by the gov-
ernment and governmental regulations of property use.32 Where the gov-
ernment authorizes a physical invasion or occupation of private property,
a taking occurs even if the action does not serve the public interest.
In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the United States Supreme Court first
held that regulation of private property is a taking if it "goes too far."
s
3
The Court held that enforcement of a Pennsylvania coal-mining statute
35
constituted a taking. Specifically, the Court determined that the stat-
Clause).
29. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661. The court recognized the importance of
states' police powers in protecting society. See id. at 661-63. The court described
this community protection concept as "essential to the peace and safety of society,
that all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community." See id. at 665.
30. See id. at 668.
31. See Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When
Should Compensation be Paid?, 23J. LEGAL STuD. 749, 751-53 (1994) (analyzing the
limits and theories of government regulation of private property prior to 1992).
32. SeeYee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1992) (holding that a
local rent control ordinance viewed in conjunction with a mobile home residency
law did not constitute a taking). The Yee court found that the ordinance at issue
did not constitute a physical taking and deferred to the California courts to ad-
dress regulatory takings claims, upholding appropriate state property use restric-
tions. See id. at 538-39. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 123-25 (1978).
33. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35 (finding a taking where a landlord was re-
quired to allow a cable company to install cables on the side of her apartment
building); see also, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1872) (holding
that a taking occurred when a state-authorized dam construction project caused
permanent flooding of private land).
34. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (finding a tak-
ing where a land use regulation prohibited certain coal mining). This decision is
noted as one which "marked a watershed in takings law." Miceli & Segerson, supra
note 31, at 751-52. One commentator labeled Pennsylvania Coal "one of the most
famous cases in the regulatory takings pantheon." See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Fed-
eralism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1124 n.23 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A.
FIScHEL, NORMS REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)).
Pennsylvania Coal is noted as the first case to require compensation for a regula-
tory taking. See STEVENJ. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, § 3-6(m)(1)(i), at 119
(1996).
35. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415-16. The statute provided that it was
[Vol. 24
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ute's prohibitions went "too far" because they destroyed the coal com-
36
pany's mineral rights. In the seventy-five years since Pennsylvania Coal,
courts have avoided further defining the phrase "too far" as it applies to
37
regulatory takings.
With no definitive takings standard, the courts, private landowners,
and land developers struggle with unpredictability and tension between
land use regulations and private property rights.s3 Unsurprisingly, many
still debate when governmental regulation should be considered a taking39
requiring compensation. Over the years, courts have tried to develop a
definitive regulatory takings standard, but have been unable to articulate
more than a series of unpredictable tests.40
1. Historical Takings Tests
a. Nuisance Test
For over a century, the United States Supreme Court has developed a
series of regulatory takings tests.4 ' Two of the most notable tests articu-
lated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are the nuisance
unlawful "to conduct the operation of mining anthracite coal as to cause the cav-
ing-in, collapse, or subsidence of (a) Any public building...; (b) Any street, road,
bridge...; (c) Any track, roadbed, right of way...;(d) Any dwelling or other
structure used as a human habitation...." See id. at 393-94.
36. See id. at 415.
37. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (commenting that there is no "set for-
mula" for determining how far is "too far" as courts have preferred instead to
"engag[e] in... essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries") (citing Goldblatt v. Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
38. See Kordesh, supra note 28, at 460. Takings law has evolved into a ran-
dom splintering of narrow property interests. Such splintering has created a
trend in protecting property, which, in turn, has perpetuated the erosion of po-
lice powers. Kordesh prefers to see courts recognize the beneficial impact that
police powers have on private property. See id. at 462-64.
39. Numerous law review articles discuss the lack of a definitive regulatory
takings standard. See Rose, supra note 34, at 1121 (reviewing Fischel's book, which
acknowledges the elusiveness of the regulatory takings concept); see also Hippler,
supra note 28, at 654 (discussing the confusion surrounding government regula-
tion and the multitude of scholarly theories used to evaluate regulatory takings
issues).
40. See Penn Centra 438 U.S. at 124 (stating that the Court has been unable
to establish a fixed takings standard). Bruce Ackerman, author of PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONsTrrunON (1977), wrote that he has "not encountered a
single lawyer, judge, or scholar who views existing case-law as anything but a chaos
of confused argument which ought to be set right if one only knew how." SeeJed
Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993).
41. See Floyd B. Olson, The Enigma of Regulatoy Takings, 20 WM. MrrcHELL L.
REV. 433, 435 (1994) (discussing the variety of both state and federal standards for
determining regulatory takings).
1998]
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42 43
test and the diminution in value test. These tests promote social and
economic considerations in justifying the state's exercise of its police
44
power.
The nuisance test4s focuses on protecting the public from harmful
activities.4 6 Under this test, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory legislation
that protects the public from harmful activities is a proper exercise of po-
lice power and does not effect a taking. 47 In Mugler v. Kansas,4 8 the Su-
preme Court first applied common law nuisance principles to land use
regulations. 49 In Mugler, the court held that a state statute which prohib-
ited the sale or manufacture of alcohol did not constitute a taking of a50
brewery owner's property. The court reasoned that even though the
statute clearly deprived a brewery owner of property, the regulation right-. , . ,,51
fully protected the surrounding community from the 'evils" of alcohol.
Thus, if a regulation affecting certain property use promotes the Rublic
health, morals, and safety of the community, there will be no taking.• 53
In another nuisance case, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that made it unlawful to oper-
42. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (finding that where
a regulation is a nuisance control measure which protects the public from harm,
there is no taking).
43. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). Under the
diminution in value test, where the value of the property has diminished to a cer-
tain level due to the regulation, a taking has occurred. See id.
44. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal 260 U.S. at 414 (shielding company from fi-
nancial loss, an economic concern); Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 409 (controlling a
brickyard nuisance, a societal concern); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671
(1887) (protecting the public from harmful activities of breweries, a societal con-
cern).
45. The nuisance test has also been referred to as the "harmful or noxious
use" principle. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023
(1992) (stating that earlier opinions suggested that governments may regulate
"harmful or noxious use" of property without compensation).
46. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69 (holding that there is no taking if a regula-
tion prohibits property use that is harmful to the public health, morals or safety).
47. See id. (stating that it is "essential to the peace and safety of society, that
all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's
use of it shall not be injurious to the community").
48. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
49. See William K. Jones, Confscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 27 (1995) (identifying Mugleras the "leading case on preven-
tion of harm"); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 40, at 1085 n.47 (naming several
state court decisions that previously adopted the noxious use principle).
50. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
51. See id. at 662.
52. See id. at 668-69. Later cases regard the nuisance control rationale as an
attempt to explain why government could affect landowner property values and
not compensate for them. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1022-23 (1992).
53. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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ate a brickyard in a residential neighborhood. 54  The brickyard was
deemed a harmful nuisance under the ordinance. 55 There too, the Court
sought to protect the public from potential harm to health and safety.
Thus, early case law used the nuisance test to balance the public
benefit of a particular land use against the extent of harm suffered by the
landowner. If the benefit to the public outweighed the harm to the
landowner, courts found no taking even if the landowner's property was
significantly damaged or impaired. Valid nuisance control measures
continue in use today, particularly in the area of environmental litiga-
58
non.
b. Diminution in Value Test
The "diminution in value" test measures a claimant's economic loss. 5 9
Under this test, a taking occurs when a government regulation, which is
not a nuisance control measure, places too large of a burden on a land-60
owner. In other words, where damage to a landowner's property ex-
61
ceeds a certain monetary level, there is a taking. In Pennsylvania Coal Co.
54. See id. at 409-10.
55. See id. at 410-11.
56. See, e.g., L'Hote v. City of New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 600 (1900)
(allowing prostitution restrictions); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)
(holding that a regulation banning the manufacture and sale of alcohol did not
constitute a taking of a landowner's breweries); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97
U.S. 659, 678 (1878) (finding no taking where regulations restrict transportation
of noxious waste).
57. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962)
(determining no taking based on prevention of noxious use where regulation
prohibited excavation below the water table); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280
(1928) (finding no taking where a landowner was forced to cut down his red ce-
dar trees that were considered a nuisance because they threatened to spread dis-
ease to nearby apple orchards).
58. See Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 n.3 (Minn. 1996)
(stating that the nuisance prevention cases have been "kept alive"). Environ-
mental regulation is an area that continues to rely on the nuisance test. See
EAGLE, supra note 34, § 13, at 531-75 (providing a recent analysis of environmental
regulations in conjunction with the takings concept). For the landmark case on
this topic, see Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (holding that
a wetlands ordinance does not constitute a taking on the basis of the nuisance
test).
59. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). This the-
ory determines police power limits by considering the diminution in value of the
property. See id. Under this approach, a large amount of damage may require
compensation while a small amount would not. See id.
60. See id. at 413-14. See also Miceli & Segerson, supra note 31, at 751 (setting
forth an economic rationale for the nuisance test).
61. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. The facts in a particular case de-
termine whether the monetary value is sufficient to amount to a taking. See id. See
also Kordesh, supra note 28, at 437-38 (stating that the Pennsylvania Coal test bal-
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62
v. Mahon, for example, the Court distinguished between a taking based
63
on economic loss and a valid exercise of the police power. In Pennsylva-
nia Coal, the plaintiff company owned the contract rights to mine coal un-
der the surface of Mahon's house. 64 The Pennsylvania legislature later
enacted a statute that essentially restricted Pennsylvania Coal from exercis-
iig its right to mine coal underneath Mahon's property.65 Pennsylvania
Coal sued the State of Pennsylvania, claiming a taking. The court held
that the statute went "too far," because it seized commercially valuable
mining rights. 67 In its reasoning, the court emphasized that the protec-
tion of a single private home did not constitute a significant public inter--- 68
est sufficient to take the coal company's property rights.
Unfortunately, this test does not provide a simple mechanical equa-69
tion to solve takings questions. Even though later cases cite this test ex-
tensively, economic loss is currently used as only a single factor, among
many, in determining whether a regulation constitutes a taking.
2. Modern Tests
After struggling for fifty-six years with the standards set forth in pre-
vious takings cases, the United States Supreme Court developed the fol-
71 72
lowing tests: the three-factor test, the extinguished economic loss test,
ances the decrease in property value with the regulation's importance to the pub-
lic).
62. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
63. See id. at 413.
64. See id. at 412. The Coal Company had previously sold the property's sur-
face rights to the Mahons or their ancestors, but reserved the right to mine all
coal underneath the property. See id. See also EAGLE, supra note 34, § 13-6, at 119-
20 (discussing the role of the contract in the court's determination).
65. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
66. See id. at 412.
67. See id. at 414-15.
68. See id. 413-14. The Pennsylvania Coal Court hesitated to give the Mahons
more rights than they had purchased, stating that private landowners assume the
risks associated with purchasing only surface rights. See id. at 416.
69. Different holdings from three prominent coal mining cases with similar
facts demonstrate the inadequacy or shortcomings of the economic loss test.
Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493
(1987) (finding no taking where the landowner did not show a significant depri-
vation) and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138
(1977) (stating that no taking occurs where a restriction does not prevent a rea-
sonable beneficial use) with Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393 (holding that a tak-
ing occurred where a regulation prohibited coal mining, which caused subsidence
under certain structures).
70. See Kordesh, supra note 28, at 437-38.
71. See Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 124.
72. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
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73 74
the essential nexus test, and the temporary takings test.
a. Three-Factor Test
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New Yor*,75 the Supreme
Court adopted the "three-factor test."76 The Court sought to simplify
some of the older takings tests by concentrating on the regulation's finan-
cial burden on private property owners.7 7 This takings approach has been
referred to as the "economic viability" standard.78 The Court developed
three factors to determine whether a taking has occurred: (1) the severity
of the regulation's economic impact on the claimant;79 (2) the extent of
the regulation's interference with the property owner's investment backed
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action."'
In Penn Central, the Court considered whether a New York City land-
marks preservation ordinance restricting historic landmark development82
constituted a taking requiring compensation. The private owners of
Grand Central Station Terminal,8 3 an historic landmark, were denied
84
permission from the Landmarks Preservation Commission to construct a
73. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987). See
also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (applying the "essential
nexus" test).
74. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
75. 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
76. See id. at 138 (finding no taking for government regulation of a historic
landmark based on a three-factor test).
77. See id. at 124. The Court's analysis provided three general principles to
determine whether a taking occurred; the Court, however, concluded that tak-
ings decisions rely on "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." See id.
78. See Rubenfeld, supra note 40, at 1087; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138
n.36 (emphasizing that if the property's economic viability ceases, relief may be
obtained). This test does not simply rely on lost property value to determine a
taking. See Kordesh, supra note 28, at 437-38.
79. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
80. See id. The court referred to economic value in determining reasonable-
ness of police power. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962).
81. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Under this factor, a taking is more likely
when interference can readily be characterized as a physical invasion than when
the interference merely adjusts economic benefits and burdens to promote the
common good. See id.
82. See id. at 107. The Landmarks Preservation Law sought preservation of
historic buildings in addition to the applicable zoning restrictions. See id.
83. This terminal is "one of New York City's most famous buildings. Opened
in 1913, it is regarded not only as providing an ingenious engineering solution to
the problems presented by urban railroad stations, but also as a magnificent ex-
ample of the French beaux-arts style." Id. at 115.
84. The Landmarks Preservation Commission is a city planning agency re-
sponsible for the legal administration under the Landmarks Preservation Law. See
1998]
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high-rise office building over the Terminal.85 The property owners sued,
claiming they had been deprived of a valuable property interest, namely
86
the air space above the Terminal. The owners also claimed that the New
York City law diminished the value of the Terminal site. s7 Finally, the
owners argued that the law did not place the same burden on all struc-
88
tures.
In applying the first factor, the severity of the economic impact on
the claimant, the Court assessed whether the ordinance deprived the
owners of the Terminal's existing real property uses.89 The Court held the
historic landmarks law does not affect the present uses of the Terminal
because the owners could still use the property as a railroad station with
leased office space and concessions.9O
In applying the second factor, the Court reasoned that because the
owners still had a property interest in the present use of the Terminal, the
law did not interfere with the owner's reasonable expectations of gaining91....
a profit. In addition, the Court identified two additional property rights92
under which the claimant could profit from the investment. First, Penn
Central still maintained the right to submit new development plans.
93
Second, the owners held transferable development rights to construct of-
fice buildings in the area surrounding the terminal.
94
Finally, in reviewing the third factor, the regulation's character, the
Court considered the purpose of the law and whether that purpose was
95achieved. The Court relied on nuisance test principles, stating that gov-
id. at 110.
85. See id. at 116-18. The owners proposed to build a 55-story office building
on top of the terminal. See id. One commentator noted that "[a]lthough techni-
cally the terminal would survive, the aesthetic effect of surmounting it with a tall
modem building would have been profound, and civic leaders, including Jacque-
line Kennedy Onassis, mounted a defense of both the landmark and the law that
protected it." See RUTHERFORD H. PLATr, LAND USE AND SOCIETY GEOGRAPHY, LAw
AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 316 (1996).
86. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946) (finding a taking where military airplanes flying in the airspace
above a chicken farm destroyed the property's use)).
87. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
88. See id. at 133.
89. See id. at 136.
90. See id. at 136. According to the Court, the terminal's "designation as a
landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to use
the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad ter-
minal containing office space and concessions." Id.
91. See id. at 136.
92. See id. at 136-37.
93. See id. The commission only denied plans for the 55 story high-rise and
did not intend to deny all development plans. See id. at 137.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 131-32. The Court determined that the purpose of the regula-
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ernment action may curtail individual property use in order to prevent
harm.96 Under this analysis, the Court recognized that regulations permit-
ting preservation of historically significant structures "is an entirely per-
"97missible government goal. Thus, in applying the three-factor test, the
Court determined that a taking had not occurred.98
b. Extinguished Economic Value Test
Fourteenyears after Penn Central, the Court, in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council identified a new takings test.10 The Lucas court held that
a regulation that "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
the land" is a taking.'l 1 Under this "total taking" 1° 2 test, a property owner
suffers a taking when he or she sacrifices all economically beneficial use of
property for the common good. This standard operates under the
premise that total regulatory takings deserve compensation.104
In Lucas, a real estate developer ("Lucas") purchased two oceanfront
residential lots in Charlestown, South Carolina, intending to build single-
family homes. 0 5  Before Lucas started constructing the homes, South
Carolina passed the Beachfront Management Act, which effectively
tion was to preserve historic structures. See id. Penn Central did not dispute the
regulation or its purpose. See id. at 129. Rather, Penn Central argued that it re-
ceived disparate treatment under the regulation and was being "singled out." See
id. at 131.
96. See id. at 125-26. See also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928)
(holding that a state has not exceeded "its constitutional powers by deciding upon
the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which.., is of
greater value to the public."); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 441 (1915)
(upholding a statute prohibiting brickyard operation in a residential neighbor-
hood to protect the community from harm); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 595-97 (1962) (determining that the safety provided by the ordi-
nance, which banned sand and gravel excavation, outweighed the property's
beneficial use).
97. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129.
98. See id. at 138.
99. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
100. See id. at 1019. See also Lee, supra note 19, at 1847 (analyzing regulatory
takings where a regulation denies a property owner the economically beneficial
use of the land).
101. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
102. See id. at 1030.
103. See id. at 1019.
104. See Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Wish Granting and the Property Rights
Genie, 13 CONST. COM. 7, 36 (1996) (analogizing property rights to other constitu-
tionally recognized personal liberty interests inherent in our constitutional cul-
ture).
105. See Lucas, 508 U.S. at 1006-07.
106. See id. at 1008-09. The Beachfront Management Act established a base-
line for historical erosion, barring construction along the designated oceanfront
property. See id.
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barred Lucas from building any structures on the lots. 107 The Supreme
Court held that the regulation constituted a taking, in part because the
property owner was denied all economically viable use of his property.108
In so holding, the Court precluded states from eliminating all economi-
cally valuable use of private property.109
An exception to this rule applies when the prohibited land use is
considered a nuisance under the appropriate state common law.' Under
this exception, government action does not constitute a taking if it pre-
vents harm to the public." The Lucas test basically redefined the nui-
sance test. The Court, however, found it unlikely that state common law
principles could prohibit residential home construction for harm preven-
ton purposes." Since Lucas, courts have not overwhelmingly responded
to this exception.14
c. Essential Nexus Test
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has applied an "essential
nexus test." The essential nexus test applies in cases where a govern-
mental entity conditions the issuance of a land use permit on the property
owner's compliance with some condition.1 6 Under the essential nexus
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1030.
109. See id. at 1028.
110. See id. at 1030-31.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 1019. The Court stated that the harmful, noxious use analysis
was the "progenitor of our more contemporary statements" regarding the re-
quirement that land use regulations advance a legitimate interest to justify a tak-
ing. Id. at 1023-24. The justification for a rule based on the denial of all eco-
nomically feasible use is that such a denial is equal to a physical appropriation.
See generally, Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp
of Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on
Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 1 (1995) (discussing
the Lucas decision and its reliance on common law guidelines for measuring the
constitutionality of government regulations).
113. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. Such productive improvements to land are
considered essential land use. See id.
114. See Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering Inher-
ent Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1996) (describing a clear pat-
tern used by the courts since Lucasjustifying no compensation only when the nui-
sance exception "replicates" a common law exception).
115. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). Un-
der the essential nexus test courts may find a taking where a regulation imposes
an unrelated condition on the development of a landowner's property. See id.
However, courts will find no taking if a nexus exists between a legitimate state in-
terest and the condition. See id. See also Olson, supra note 41, at 448 (discussing
the Nollan decision).
116. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
[Vol. 24
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss1/4
ZEMAN V. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS
test, a takings issue is resolved by determining (1) whether there is an es-
sential nexus between the legitimate state interest and the permit condi-• 117 9
tion imposed by the city; and (2) whether the degree of exactions bears
the required relationship or rough proportionality to the proposed devel-
opment. The Supreme Court applied the "essential nexus" analysis in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission"9 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.120 Prior
to these cases, municipal governments possessed broad discretion to grant
or deny permission to private landowners for residential or commercial
land development.'
12
In Nollan, the state refused to grant the plaintiffs permission to build
a home on their land unless they granted a public easement to the state.
The Court found no taking because there was no sufficient connection
between the permit and the required easement, despite the legitimate• • 125
state interest involved. The landowner wanted to demolish a bungalow
124
on a beachfront lot and replace it with a three bedroom house. The
court determined that a legitimate state interest existed in the public's125
right to view the ocean. However, visual access was not considered a suf-
ficient connection to a permit condition that required an easement across
Nollan's beachfront property.126
In Dolan, the Supreme Court also held that a taking occurred where
the state conditioned the issuance of a building permit on the land-
owner's agreement to establish a pedestrian and bike path on a portion of
her property.127 The Court found that the state had a legitimate interest
in preventing flooding and reducing traffic congestion. However, the
essential nexus was not met because a public walkway would take Dolan's
117. See id. at 386 (citing the essential nexus test addressed in Nollan, 483 U.S.
at 837).
118. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386 (stating that this question was not addressed in
Nollan because "the connection did not meet even the loosest standard").
119. See 483 U.S. at 841-42 (finding a taking where the California Coastal
Commission conditioned the grant of a building permit on the dedication of a
public easement).
120. See 512 U.S. at 395 (finding a taking where the City Planning Commission
conditioned approval of a landowner's store expansion on establishing a
bike/pedestrian pathway on the landowner's property to relieve traffic congestion
and to minimize flooding).
121. See David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75
N.C. L. REv. 1243, 1244 (1997) (stating that "[F]or many years, the United States
Supreme Court chose not to interfere with state and local regulation of new resi-
dential and commercial development").
122. See 483 U.S. at 828.
123. See id. at 837.
124. See id. at 828.
125. See id. at 835-36.
126. See id. at 837.
127. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994).
128. See id. at 387.
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right to exclude others from the property.'l Simply offsetting some of the
traffic congestion was not considered sufficient to justify such a burden on
the landowner.
3 0
Both Nollan and Dolan indicate that the essential nexus test limits the
govemment's power to impose conditions on 'grants for land develop-
ment.'3' As a result, this test suggests that it may now be easier for private
landlords to prove a taking.
d. Temporary Takings Test
The Supreme Court also recognizes temporary takings.13 2  In First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, the Court
held that, like permanent takings, temporary takings require just compen-'54
sation. A temporary taking occurs when governmental activity or regu-
lation denies a landowner all property use for a period of time and the
regulation is later invalidated. In First English, a church purchased land
to operate a campground and recreation area for handicapped chil-
dren. A county ordinance designated the land as an interim flood pro-
tection area. 3 7 In February 1978, a storm had dropped eleven inches of
rain in the area, flooding the church's retreat center and destroying itsS 138
buildings. The church sued Los Angeles County on a theory of inverse
condemnation. 3 9 The Court held that the county must compensate the
church for the loss of property use during the time the regulation was in
effect. First English has been criticized because it failed to provide guid-
ance in determining the appropriate amount of damages due to a prop-
erty owner for a temporary taking.141
129. See id. at 394.
130. See id. at 395.
131. See Dana, supra note 121, at 1274-86 (stressing that a lack of judicial scru-
tiny coupled with the essential nexus test will decrease land development effi-
ciency).
132. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (finding a temporary taking for the loss of value for the
time period between the land-use regulation's effective date and the date it was
later invalidated).
133. See id.
134. See id. (finding that an ordinance temporarily prohibited construction by
a church in an interim flood protection area).
135. See id. at 321. The justification for this rule is that the government has a
duty to compensate the owner for any economic loss in the interim. See id.
136. See id. at 307.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 308.
140. See id.
141. SeeJoseph LaRusso, "Paying for the Change": First English Evangelical Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles and the Calculation of Interim Damages for Regula-
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3. Minnesota Tests
Minnesota law intends to fully compensate citizens for any property14214
right losses, including temporary or partial takings. 14 To establish a tak-
ing, a landowner must show a direct or substantial invasion of proper%
rights, resulting in a definite and measurable market value diminution.
Clearly, regulations reasonably related to the health, safety, welfare, and
morals of citizens serve as valid exercises of police 
power.
a. Reasonable Use Test
The Minnesota Supreme Court employs a reasonable use test in de-
termining whether takings have occurred. The reasonable use test pro-
vides that a taking occurs when the landowner's property no longer has a
reasonable use as a result of government regulation. A taking does not
occur if the regulation has a legitimate objective, unless all reasonable use
is eliminated. The test allows governments to make reasonable regula-
tions while protecting landowners' lawful use and enjoyment of their149
property. Under the reasonable use test, mere inconvenience to a
tory Takings, 17 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REv. 551 (1990) (discussing the inadequacy of
the court's decision in determining damages for a temporary taking and propos-
ing a damage formula based on fairness and predictability).
142. See State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992) (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 117.025, subd. 1 (1986)). Minnesota currently defines a taking as "every inter-
ference, under the right of eminent domain, with the possession, enjoyment, or
value of private property." MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subd. 1 (1996).
143. See Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 560.
144. See Alevizos v. Metro. Airport Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 486-87, 216
N.W.2d 651,662 (1974).
145. See Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 18, 264 N.W.2d 19, 25
(1976) (holding that a zoning ordinance that dedicated certain property for park
purposes was not a taking because of the reasonable relationship between the
dedication and the public benefits); see also Olson, supra note 41, at 442
(discussing four similar standards relying on some form of reasonable relationship
analysis involving governmental purposes and public needs).
146. See McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Minn. 1980)
(relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
147. See, e.g., Czech v. City of Blaine, 312 Minn. 535, 539, 253 N.W.2d 272, 274
(1977) (finding a taking where the government refused to rezone an area to ac-
commodate a mobile home park); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 572-
73, 118 N.W.2d 659, 672 (1962) (holding that a zoning ordinance was unconstitu-
tional because it rendered some property useless or valueless).
148. See Holaway v. City of Pipestone, 269 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Minn. 1979) (stating
that a zoning regulation merely causing a diminution in value does not result in a
taking). The court recognized a similar result under the federal Constitution
(referencing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). See id.
149. See Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 606-7 (Minn. 1978)
(finding no taking where curb and gutters were installed consistent with a public
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landowner does not constitute a taking. 151
For example, in McShane v. City of Faribault, the court considered
whether an airport zoning regulation restricted all reasonable uses of the152
plaintiff's property. The relevant zoning ordinance designated specific
land near an airport as a safety zone, permitting only limited land uses
and height restrictions for structures. The court held that the ordi-
nance constituted a taking because of the measurable loss in market value
of the property due to the limitations placed upon land use.15
b. Extinguished Economic Value Test
Minnesota courts also apply the economic test set forth in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, a test based on economically productive
or beneficial land use. 156 As noted above, Lucas held that a taking occurs
where government regulation denies a landowner of all economically
beneficial land use. 5 7 In 614 Co. v. Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency, 158
the Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized the possibility of an economic
productivity taking based on precondemnation planning action by the city
and its development agency. A landowner claimed the city's activities. .. 160
deprived him of rental income and other development possibilities.
The city development agency publicly targeted the landowner's property
for condemnation over a three-year period but ultimately abandoned the161
project. The landowner argued that these actions reduced his commer-
cial occupancy, interfered with his ability to market to new tenants, and
162prevented him from further developing and improving his property.
The court concluded these allegations could "permit proof that the city's
improvement project).
150. See McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 258-59 (finding that an airport zoning ordi-
nance constitutes a taking due to the significant safety interests involved and sub-
stantial decline in market value).
151. 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980).
152. See id. at 257.
153. See id. at 255-56.
154. See id. at 258-59.
155. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
156. See 614 Co. v. Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency, 547 N.W.2d 400,
405-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a taking occurs when a landowner is
deprived of all economically viable land use, even if temporarily). The Minnesota
Court of Appeals recognized that the Supreme Court has not developed a precise
standard for distinguishing temporary takings from permanent takings. See id. at
407.
157. See 505 U.S. at 1019.
158. 547 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
159. See id. at407-08.
160. See id. at 406.
161. See id. at 403-04.
162. See id. at 406-07.
[Vol. 24
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss1/4
ZEMAN V. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS
and [its development agency's] actions left [the landowner] without eco-
nomically viable rental and development use," permitting a cause of ac-
don for a taking.163
c. De Facto Test
Minnesota courts have created a "de facto" taking standard based on
the amount of control that a government has over a private party's land
use.6 4 The test recognizes a taking when a government abuses its eminent
domain powers and directs its regulation at a particular parcel of prop-165
erty. There is no taking when the state does not physically or legally
prevent the landowner's use of theroperty.
In Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, the Minnesota Court of Appeals ap-
plied the de facto test to facts involving a state decision to consider con-
demnation and the impact of that decision on the landowner involved.
1 6
Minnesota considered plans to condemn some or all of the Fitger Brewing169
Company property for highway expansion. Although the state eventu-
ally chose to reroute the highway, Fitger had already decided to close in
lieu of investing in needed improvements. 17 The court ruled that the in-
ability of the state to assure Fitger that a condemnation would certainly
occur did not rise to the level of a de facto taking.'
d. Rough Praportionality Test
Another test used by Minnesota courts focuses on the "rough propor-•. 172
tionality" of governmental conditions. Under this test, the government
must establish that the nature and extent of the government condition
163. See id. at 407-08.
164. See Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, 416 N.W.2d 200, 208 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
165. See id. at 207.
166. See id. See also Orfield v. Hous. and Redev. Auth. of City of St. Paul, 305
Minn. 336, 342, 232 N.W.2d 923,927 (1975) (holding that economic loss due to
normal activities associated with an urban renewal project does not constitute a de
facto taking).
167. 416 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
168. See id. at 201-08.
169. See id. at 201-03.
170. See id. at 203-04. Fitger was under pressure from the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (PCA) to install pollution control devices at the brewery at an es-
timated cost of $100,000. See id. at 201-02. The deadline set by the PCA did not
allow Fitger to wait until the state made its final decision. See id. at 202-04.
171. See id. at 208. The court noted that the state was careful to explain to Fit-
ger that the state's plans could change, making condemnation unnecessary. See
id.
172. See Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 286
(Minn. Ct. App 1996) (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
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173
bears a "rough proportionality" to the condition's impact. The court, in
applying this test, analyzes a takings issue under the United States Consti-
tution and under the Minnesota Constitution. 7 4 Under the United States
Constitution, the takings determination is based on whether the ordi-
nance at issue is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.175
Essentially the same analysis occurs under the Minnesota Constitution, al-
though three factors are considered: (i) whether the ordinance promotes
a public purpose; (ii) whether the ordinance is an unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious interference with private interests; and (iii) whether the
means chosen are rationally related to the public purpose sought to be
served.
176
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloom-177
ington, found no taking where an ordinance was specifically designed to178
advance a governmental interest. The ordinance required mobile home
park owners who close or change the use of their parks to pay relocation
costs to the park residents.' 79 The court recognized a rough proportional-
ity between the ordinance requiring payment of relocation costs and the
reduced economic devastation on park residents.'
80
e. Public Necessity Doctrine
The public necessity doctrine allows one to enter another's land for
the purpose of averting a public disaster. 18' The test reasons that the in-
terest of public welfare supersedes the rights of the private property land-
owner. s2 As such, the state can use its police powers to act in the interest•183 . - = . 184
of public safety. In McDonald v. City of Red Wing, for example, the
173. See id.
174. See id. at 285-87 (quoting Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455 N.W.2d
512, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
175. See id. at 286.
176. See id. at 288 (citing Grussing v. Kvam Implement Co., 478 N.W.2d 200,
202 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)).
177. 552 N.W.2d 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
178. See id. at 287.
179. See id. at 284.
180. See id.
181. See Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1991)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965)). The doctrine provides
that " [o] ne is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is, or if the
actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an immi-
nent public disaster." Id.
182. See id.
183. See City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Minn. 1986) (quoting
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) in stating, "the public
use requirement of the Fifth Amendment is coterminous with the scope of a sov-
ereign's police powers.").
184. 13 Minn. 38, 40 (1868).
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court found no taking and excused the city from paying compensation
where a buildin4 was destroyed to prevent the spread of fire in the interest
of public safety.
However, a state's actions in the interest of public safety could still•. 186
constitute a taking. For example, in Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co.,
the Minnesota Supreme Court found a taking when police officers caused
private property damage to an innocent third party's home while trying to187
apprehend an armed criminal suspect. Even though the apprehension
of a criminal suspect benefits the entire community, the court reasoned
that an innocent third party should not carry the entire cost of the bene-
fit.'W This recent case narrowed the public necessity doctrine in the in-. . ... 189
terest of fairness to avoid burdening innocent citizens.
III. THE ZEMANDECISION
A. The Facts
Robert Zeman owned and operated a multi-unit residential apart-.190
ment building in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The City of Minneapolis re-
quires rental property operators to comply with the housing ordinance,
including rental licensure requirements. Because Zeman owned rental
property within the city limits, he was required to comply with the ordi-
nance.
In 1991, Minneapolis added a new provision to the housing ordi-
nance. The new provision required rental property licensees to curtail
disorderly conduct by tenants or their guests on the licensed property.193
185. See id.
186. See Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 42.
187. See id. Minneapolis police officers staked out a home in north Minneapo-
lis, in attempts to apprehend two suspected felons believed to be dealing stolen
narcotics. See id. at 39. The suspects fled and after a high speed chase, one sus-
pect barricaded himself in Harriet Wegner's home. See id. Tear gas and "flash-
bang" grenades were fired into the home, causing extensive property damage to
the home. See id.
188. See id. at 42.
189. See id.
190. See Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Minn. 1996).
191. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1810 (1995) (requiring
that landlords obtain licenses in order to rent residential housing to tenants); see
also Appellant's brief at 1, Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.
1996) (No. CX-95-429). Zeman renewed his rental license annually. See id.
192. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 550.
193. See id. (citing MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 244.20 (1995)).
The Minneapolis Housing Code defines a "disorderly use" as:
a violation, on the licensed premises, of any of the following:
(1) Minnesota Statutes, Sections 609.75 through 609.76, which prohibit
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The Minneapolis police department's community service bureau is re-. . . 194
sponsible for the enforcement of the provision. Once the bureau makes
a determination of disorderly use, it notifies the rental licensee by mail.' 95
The notification specifies the appropriate action the licensee must take to196 ..
remedy the problem. A second notification letter is sent to the licensee
if another incident of "disorderly use" occurs within twelve months after
the first reported violation. 9 7 This second notice requires a written re-
sponse to the bureau disclosing any actions taken or proposed to remedy
the situation. 9 8  Finally, a third disorderly use incident within twelve
months may result in the landlord's rental license being "denied, revoked,
suspended or not renewed."' 99
Zeman received three notices of disorderly use. Zeman's three
disorderly use notices involved a threatened assault, a police controlled201
crack cocaine deal, and a drug arrest. With the third notice, Zeman also
202
received a recommendation that the city revoke his license. Zeman ap-
gambling;
(2) Minnesota Statutes, Sections 609.321 through 609.324, which pro-
hibits prostitution and acts relating thereto;
(3) Minnesota Statutes, Sections 152.01 through 152.025, and Section
152.027, Subdivisions 1 and 2, which prohibit the unlawful sale or pos-
session of controlled substances;
(4) Minnesota Statutes, Section 340A.401, which prohibits the unlawful
sale of alcoholic beverages;
(5) Section 385.110 of this Code, which prohibits noisy assemblies;
(6) Minnesota Statutes, Sections 97B.021, 97B.045, 609.66 through
609.67 and 624.712 through 624.716, and section 393.40, 393.50, 393.70,
393.80, 393.90, and 393.150 of this Code, which prohibit the unlawful
possession, transportation, sale or use of a weapon; or
(7) Minnesota Statutes, Sections 609.72 and Section 385.90 of this Code,
which prohibit disorderly conduct, when the violation disturbs the peace
and quiet of the occupants of at least two (2) units on the licensed prem-
ises or other premises, other than the unit occupied by the person(s)
committing the violation.
See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 549-550 n.1 (quoting MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF
ORDiNANcEs § 244.2020(a) (1995)).
194. See id. at 550. The bureau consists of Minneapolis police officers who
work in the Community Crime Prevention SAFE program. See Appellant's brief at
2, Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1996) (No. CX-95-429).
195. See id. (citing MINNEAPOLIs, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 244.2020(c)
(1995)).
196. See id.
197. See id. (citing § 244.2020(d)).
198. See id.
199. See id. (citing § 244.2020(e)).
200. See id. Zeman received notices of disorderly use on June 30, 1992, March
12, 1993, and April 21, 1993. See id.
201. See Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 540 N.W.2d 532, 534 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995).
202. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 550.
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pealed the revocation recommendation to the Rental Dwelling License
203
Board of Appeals. The Board concluded that Zeman failed to take the
appropriate action necessary under section 244.2020 of the housing ordi-
nance to resolve the disorderly use.2 4 Following the Board's decision, the
City of Minneapolis voted to revoke Zeman's license.20 5 Zeman sued the
City seeking reinstatement of his rental license and damages for an al-
206
leged taking.
The trial court held that Zeman's license was revoked in error be-
cause the alleged disorderly conduct did not involve occupants of the207
premises. The ordinance, the court noted, specifically referred to208
"disorderly use" by occupants of the rental property. Zeman asserted
that the housing ordinance and the subsequent revocation eliminated all
209economic value in the property use, constituting a regulatory taking.
The trial court reinstated Zeman's license and granted partial summary210
judgment in favor of the City on the takings claim. The trial court
granted partial summary judgment because Zeman failed to establish that
the property lost all of its economic value or that there was no alternative
use for the property.211
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the
trial court applied the wrong takings analysis. 212 The case was remanded
to the trial court for analysis under the Penn Central test.213 The City ap-
214pealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
B. The Court's Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court, finding no taking, reversed the deci-2I5
sion of the appellate court. The issue presented to the Zeman court was
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. Zeman also brought other claims not at issue in Zeman. See id.
207. See id. at 550-51. Two of the three disorderly use incidents involved per-
sons who did not occupy Zeman's property. See 540 N.W.2d at 534 n.1.
208. See 552 N.W.2d at 550-51.
209. See id. at 551. The appraiser valued the building and lot at a negative
$20,000 to $25,000 if sold. See id. The appraiser further noted that the property
was only valuable because Zeman owned it and it was not economically feasible for
a new party to start a rental venture in such a depressed neighborhood. See id.
210. See id. at 550-51.
211. See id. at 551. Zeman's expert witness, a real estate appraiser, testified
that the economic value of the 1030 Morgan Avenue property was "very close to
zero" due to the residential zoning restrictions and the economically depressed
neighborhood. See id.
212. See id. (stating that the Penn Central analysis is the proper takings test).
213. See id.
214. See id at 550.
215. See id. at 555. The court reasoned that, while citizens are naturally bur-
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whether a rental license revocation by the City constituted a regulatory
216
taking under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. The court
acknowledged that current regulatory takings law "stems from a nebulous
notion" and that cases have not established a clear test for determining
takings.21' Lacking a defined takings test, the court used a case by case
218
analysis relying on the specific facts of Zeman.
Zeman's rental license was eventually reinstated by the trial court.
Therefore, the supreme court first considered whether a temporary tak-
ing, if one actually occurred, should be treated differently from a perma-
nent taking. 21 Basing its decision on First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church, the court held that the status of the taking, temporary or perma-
220
nent, did not impact its analysis.21
The court next applied the Penn Central three factor test. In so do-
ing, the court considered the housing ordinance's economic impact, its
interference with investment backed expectations, and the character of
the government action.2
First, the court assessed the ordinance's economic impact on
223
Zeman's property use. The court found that Zeman suffered a signifi-
cant economic impact since a rental apartment building was the best use
of the property. Without the rental license, Zeman was unable to oper-
ate his apartment. In addition, both rezoning the property or finding a
new buyer were unlikely due to the economically depressed nature of the
dened by legislative restrictions, they also benefit from the restrictions placed on
others. See id. at 554-55.
216. See id. at 551. Since a regulatory ordinance was involved, the court de-
termined there was no physical appropriation constituting a taking. See id.
217. See id. at 552.
218. See id. "[T]akings law turns largely on the particular facts underlying
each case." See id. (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
219. See id. at 553.
220. The United States Supreme Court has held that temporary takings are
not treated differently than permanent takings. See id. (citing First English Lu-
theran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
221. See id. at 552 n.3. The Zeman court stated that Penn Central "provides the
best formulation of the factors the Supreme Court deems important to takings
analysis." Id. (citingJOHN E. NoWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUnONAL LAW
463 (5th ed. 1995); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184
(1967).
222. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 552.
223. See id. at 553. The Zeman court supported the use of police power as a means
for nuisance prevention. See id. Citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 as an exception, the
court stated that the regulation only caused a reduction in property value and not a com-
plete denial of economically beneficial use. See id. at 553 n.4.
224. See id. at 553.
225. See id.
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226
neighborhood.
Second, the court determined whether the housing ordinance inter-
227
fered with Zeman's investment backed expectations. The court found
that since Zeman operated the apartment building since 1975, he ex-
pected a reasonable economic return.28 The court quickly disposed of
the first two factors, admitting that the decision was leaning in Zeman's
favor.
2
2
Third, the court used nuisance test principles to apply the final factor, 230
relating to the government regulation's character. The court analyzed231
the regulation, its purpose and its likelihood of success. The Zeman
court stated that the housing ordinance intended to protect residential
neighborhoods from criminal activity. 32 The court justified the ordinance
as a harm prevention measure stating that governments traditionally
avoided paying compensation when the regulation prevents public
harm.233 The court explained that the ordinance achieves a legitimate
public interest in deterring criminal activity. 4 In conclusion, the court
stated that the City was justified in revoking the rental licenses of land-
lords who refuse to cooperate with attempts to curb criminal activities on
th " .235
their properties.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ZEMAN DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Zeman perpetuated one problem
and created another. First, the court failed to identify the appropriate
regulatory takings test to apply with respect to temporary regulatory tak-
236ings. Second, the court clearly expanded the burden of government
226. See id.
227. See id. at 551, 553.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 553-54. Witnesses for Zeman testified at trial that the economic
value of the property was "very close to zero." See id. at 551.
230. See id. The court found this factor to be similar to a "Mugler-based analy-
sis." Id.
231. See id. at 554.
232. See id.
233. See id. The court stated that harm prevention is the "preeminent theory
by which the state has traditionally been able to avoid paying compensation." Id.
(citing Bruce W. Burton, Regulatory Takings and the Shape of Things to Come: Harbin-
gets of a Takings Clause Reconstellation, 72 ORE. L. REv. 603, 617-18 (1993)).
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. The Zeman court stated that the temporary revocation of Zeman's license
did not impact the takings analysis. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (holding that temporary tak-
ings are "not different from permanent takings"). In addition, the Zeman court
stated that the regulation was not a severe responsibility for landlords. Zeman, 552
N.W.2d at 554.
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regulations on common citizens.
A. An Old Problem
In Zeman, the court focused on the three-factor test dealing with
economic impact, interference with investment backed expectations, and137
the character of the governmental action. The Zeman court determined
238that the first two factors of the test clearly favored a taking. The Zeman
court manipulated the third factor to justify the ordinance as a harm pre-239
vention measure, citing a list of common nuisance test cases. The court
relied on this nuisance prevention analysis to declare that the state's exer-
cise of police power was constitutional. The court avoided any tempo-
rary takings analysis. Indeed, it simply stated that a taking may have oc-
curred, 24' but Zeman should not be compensated because the ordinance
served as a significant harm-prevention measure.
Admittedly, the government would have a nearly impossible task. ... .242
regulating private property use if a precise takings test existed. How-
ever, landowners also face the impossible task of defending their land use
without knowing the takings test that applies. Courts presently subject
landowners to a variety of takings tests. As a result, these landowners sac-
rifice their land use to maintain the ad hoc approach to takings law. In
Zeman, the court failed to provide reasons for using the three-factor test.
In so doing, the court only muddied the already murky waters of takings
law in Minnesota.
B. A New Problem
In addition to failing to pinpoint a clear and straightforward takings
test, the Zeman court expanded the regulatory burden on common citi-
zens who own property, particularly rental property owners. By upholding
the disorderly conduct ordinance, the court forced landlords to curtail all
potentially violative behavior that occurs on their property, even if the
237. See id. at 552 n.3 (citing scholarly agreement that the three-factor test is
the best test to use in a takings analysis).
238. See id. at 553.
239. See id. at 554-55 (considering the character of the government action and
the likelihood of its preventing injury to the community's health, morals or
safety).
240. See id. at 554. The court stated that the ordinance is "designed to serve a
legitimate public interest, deterring criminal activity in residential neighbor-
hoods, by enlisting the aid of landlords." Id.
241. See id. at 553.
242. SeeJohn A. Humbach, "Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting
Property Interests and Judicial Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV.
771, 778 (1993) (stating that regulations are not "inherently wrong," even if pri-
vate property values or uses are affected).
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245
conduct does not involve ociupants of the property. As a result, the
regulation provides a disincentive for common people to purchase and
244
rent property.
Unfortunately for landlords in Minneapolis, the Zeman court in effect245
imposed "police responsibilities" on rental property owners. In doing
so, the court determined that policing property should be an incidentalS246
part of operating rental dwellings. However, such a broad crime control
measure clearly burdens a small segment of the population-owners of247
residential rental property. As such, the revocation of Zeman's rental
license should have constituted a taking and required payment of just
compensation.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes the broad governmen-
tal powers available to regulate housing conditions, particularly landlord
and tenant relationships. -M The Zeman court, as well, deferred to the leg-
249islature in relying on the public health and safety rationale, but did so at
a significant cost. Currently, the Minneapolis ordinance requires land-
lords to police the activities of persons who reside in, visit, or trespass on
their rental properties. For inner city landlords in high-crime areas, the
task may be overwhelming.
American cities constantly struggle with inner-city housing problems.
For example, poor residents of Minneapolis and St. Paul face difficult
250problems obtaining quality low-income housing. Approximately one-
half of all low-income renters devote more than half of their income to
251housing costs. Unfortunately the number of low-income housing op-
243. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 554. Not all of the disorderly conduct inci-
dents resulting in Zeman's license revocation dealt with tenants of his building.
See id. at 550-51. The ordinance clearly states, however, that a rental dwelling li-
cense may be revoked after three disorderly use violations involving occupants.
See id. at 550.
244. See generally, B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture
Standards Imposing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 679 (1992) (concluding that the costs of policing tenants may be enough for
many landowners to leave the rental property business).
245. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 555.
246. See id. at 554.
247. See generally Glesner, supra note 244. Glesner concludes that imposing
penalties on landlords for the crimes of their tenants is an ineffective means of
controlling crime. See id.
248. SeeYee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527-28 (1992) (holding that a
local rent control ordinance viewed in conjunction with a mobile home residency
law did not constitute a taking).
249. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d 554. The court relied on broad definitions of the
regulation and its public protection purposes. See id.
250. See Diaz, supra note 11, at IA.
251. See Peter Dreier, The New Politics of Housing: How to Rebuild the Constituency
for a Progressive Federal Housing Policy, 63 J. AM. PLANNING ASS'N, 5 (1997)
(addressing the importance of the nation's housing, specifically the decline of
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tions steadily decreases as a result of urban renewal, condominium con-
252
version and gentrification. The current housing crisis requires cities to
encourage landlords to purchase and develop low income housing. The
Zeman legacy will only discourage rather than encourage such needed de-
velopment.
Clearly, there is a need for landlords, as well as the general public, to
engage in crime control and crime prevention measures. However, the
Zeman court's decision goes too far. Admittedly, crime control regulations
benefit the public as a whole, including the burdened landlord. But,
the Zeman decision allows the government to avoid compensating private
landlords and imposes significant burdens on these select citizens.
To balance the competing goals of social welfare and landowner pro-
tection, local governments should offer property investment incentives to
assist local governments in crime control or to participate in community
safety programs. In addition, tenants and community residents, not
landlords, should be held responsible for their own actions, Under-
standably, the government has a significant interest in achieving crime
control objectives. However, the Zeman court's approach thrusts too se-
vere a blow on the common citizen.
256
V. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the Zeman decision failed to clarify regulatory takings
law in Minnesota. First, the Zeman court refused to define when courts
should employ the various tests in determining takings issues. Second, the
Zeman court forced landlords to police all potentially violative behavior on
their property, even if the conduct does not involve tenants of the prop-
erty. The court has essentially perpetuated one takings problem and cre-
ated another. Absent clarification of these issues, common citizens will be
America's low income housing market).
252. See id.
253. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491
(1987) (stating that certain restrictions are "properly treated as part of the burden
of common citizenship") (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1, 5
(1949)). Compare Marzulla & Marzulla, supra note 22 (supporting the necessity of
legislative deference relative to private land use regulations) with Glesner, supra
note 244 (concluding that the legislative deference afforded certain crime control
regulations has penalized private property owners).
254. See Burton, supra note 233. The author promotes the idea that current
takings law tempts governments to impose regulations on private property owners
and avoid compensating the burdened landowner. See id.
255. See generally, Glesner, supra note 244 (analyzing the penalties currently
imposed on landlords for crime on their premises and suggesting alternative
methods to control crime).
256. See id. at 791 (discussing the undesirable shift that the law has taken to-
wards requiring landlords to police the community).
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required to challenge society's burdens without obtaining appropriate and
just compensation from the government.
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